Table of contents:
M.3.1.1. Evidence with regard to the orders
M.P.26. Evidence of the provocative text of the orders.
M.P.27. Evidence of the recipient of the orders.
M.P.27.1. Evidence of the use of a commander who himself issued a criminal order before.
M.P.30. Evidence of the mode of combat recommended in an order being actually used on the ground.
M.P.31. Evidence of the utterance of the attackers stating that they are acting on orders.
M.3.1.2. Evidence with regard to the weapons and/or military assets employed
M.P.32. Evidence of the systematic use of a combat weapon.
M.P.33. Evidence of the substantial amount of the weapons used.
M.P.34. Evidence of the suspects authority in terms of the use of weapons.
M.3.1.3. Evidence of the large-scale and systematic nature of the crimes perpetrated
M.P.36. Evidence of the scale and uniformity of the crimes.
M.P.38. Evidence that all the military units acted in a co-ordinated manner.
M.P.39. Evidence of an entire villages being burned.
M.P.40. Evidence of the houses of an ethnic group being systematically selected as targets.
M.P.44. Evidence of sufficient means of communication.
M.3.1.4. Evidence of the general context of persecution of a civilian population.
Element:
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment (TC), 31 July 2003, paras. 444-445:
"(c) Ordering
444. The Prosecution submits in respect of ordering that proof is required that one or more persons performed the actus reus of the crime in question as a perpetrator, with or without the participation of the accused. Such proof, in the Prosecutions opinion, includes the perpetrators having acted "in execution of or otherwise in furtherance of an express or implied order by the accused to the perpetrator as a subordinate or other person over whom the accused possessed de jure or de facto authority to order."954 A formal superior-subordinate relationship between the accused and the perpetrator need not have existed; it is sufficient that the accused possessed the authority to order and that that authority can be reasonably implied.955 Finally, the Prosecutor contends with regard to ordering that the accused must fulfil the relevant mens rea requirement of the crime in question and have been aware of the substantial likelihood that the crime committed would be a consequence of the implementation of the order given.956
445. The Trial Chamber considers ordering to refer to "a person in a position of authority using that position to convince another to commit an offence."957 The person ordering must have the required mens rea for the crime with which he is charged958 and must have been aware of the substantial likelihood that the crime committed would be the consequence when executing or otherwise furthering the implementation of the order. The Trial Chamber considers, however, that an additional conviction for ordering a particular crime is not appropriate where the accused is found to have committed the same crime."
"954 - Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 161, citing the Blaskic Trial Judgement, paras 281-282 and Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 388.
955 - Ibid.
956 - Ibid.
957 - Krstic Trial Judgement, para. 601.
958 - Blaskic Trial Judgement, paras 278 and282."
M.3.1.1. Evidence with regard to the orders
M.P.26. Evidence of the provocative text of the orders.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 640-646:
"b) Discussion
640. Initially, the Trial Chamber will analyse the content of the military orders sent by the accused to the commander of the Ban Jelacic Brigade. It will then infer from the systematic and widespread nature of the crimes perpetrated and the general context within which they occurred that the military operations conducted in April and June 1993 in the Kiseljak enclave were ordered by General Blaskic himself.
i) The combat preparation order and combat order
641. The Trial Chamber will first look at the contents of the combat preparation order 1492 and the combat order 1493 of 17 April 1993. It will next determine to whom the orders were sent and the military assets ordered to be used.
a. The texts of the combat preparation order and combat order
642. In orders issued at 09:10 hours and 23:45 hours on 17 April 1993, General Bla skic instructed the Kiseljak Ban Jelacic Brigade to seize several Muslim villages in the municipality.
643. The first, a combat preparation order, was addressed to the commander of the brigade instructing him to prepare his troops inter alia to "engage in the blockade of Visnjica and other villages that can be used by the enemy to launch an attack" 1494 , to "take control of Gomionica and Svinjarevo " 1495 and to inform the accused as soon as he was ready to launch the offensives 1496 . The second order directed the "Ban Jelacic Brigade Command Kiseljak" to launch those military operations at 05:30 hours on 18 April 1993 and to "capture Gomionica and Svinjarevo" 1497 .
644. The Trial Chamber observes that in these orders General Blaskic used terms which were not strictly military and had emotional connotations which were such as to incite hatred and vengeance against the Muslim populations. The opening paragraph of the combat order began with the following assertion:
Using the same terms, the fourth paragraph added:
The ninth paragraph included an emphatic call to the responsibility of the commander who received the order to "maintain a sense of historic responsibility" 1500 .
645. The same terms were again to be found in the combat preparation order of 17 April 1993, in particular in the opening paragraph:
The orders ninth paragraph also emphatically conferred an historic role upon the Kiseljak HVO commander and his troops:
646. Based only on the text, the Trial Chamber notes that the accused used particularly clear terms in entrusting the commander of the Ban Jelacic Brigade with an attack mission. He gave the order to "engage in the blockade of Visnjica and other villages " 1503 and to "take control of" 1504 or "capture" 1505 Gomionica and Svinjarevo . Despite the contention of the Defence, the terms used do not suggest that General Blaskic ordered the commander to capture only the ABiH positions allegedly located in the towns. On the contrary, the eighth paragraph implied that his task went well beyond that. The accused employed radical words in the order which have connotations of "eradication": "All assault operations must be successful and to that end, use units of the Military Police and civilian police for the mop-up" 1506 ."
"1492 - D299.
1493 - D300.
1494 - D299.
1495 - D299.
1496 - D299.
1497 - D300.
1498 - D300 (emphasis added).
1499 - D300 (emphasis added).
1500 - D300 (emphasis added).
1501 - D299 (emphasis added).
1502 - D299 (emphasis added). These same affirmations are also to be found in the combat orders issued at 18:45 hours and 21:40 hours on 19 April. The first states that "StChe future of all Croats of Busovaca, Travnik, Vitez and Novi Travnik depends upon your success, whereas in Zenica /words illegible/ in any concentration camp, particularly in Gornja Zenica, where our people who fled from the centre of Zenica are being slaughtered even today. There is a massacre" (P456/49) (emphasis added). The second asserts that "SaCt the moment, the Croatian people of Zenica are going through a most critical period. They are literally being slaughtered" (P456/50).
1503 - D299.
1504 - D299.
1505 - D300.
1506 - D300 (emphasis added)."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
M.P.27. Evidence of the recipient of the orders.
Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Renzaho, Case No. ICTR-97-31-T, Judgement (TC), 14 July 2009, para. 181:
"181. [..] Witness GLJ also confirmed that roadblocks were established after having received such orders and that killing occurred at them.218
218 Witness GLJ, T. 22 January 2007 pp. 22-23 ("Q. Well, did you establish roadblocks after receiving these instructions? A. We were with the responsable of the cellule in the meeting. So after the roadblock after the meeting, roadblocks were erected throughout the cellule, in all cellules Q. Well, from the discussions at the meeting, was it apparent if anything similar had happened at other roadblocks throughout the city, that people had been killed? A. Yes. In the town there were people who were killed at the roadblock. And I explained that at Gitega they nearly killed my driver. And there were, obviously, others who would have been killed at that roadblock ... The witness: I admitted that I had the roadblocks to be erected, because there were people who were killed at such roadblocks. I also admitted that because I recognised that there were people who were not able to flee because of the roadblocks, those are part and parcel of my confessions.").
M.P.27.1. Evidence of the use of a commander who himself issued a criminal order before.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 640-641, 647-649:
"b) Discussion
640. Initially, the Trial Chamber will analyse the content of the military orders sent by the accused to the commander of the Ban Jelacic Brigade. It will then infer from the systematic and widespread nature of the crimes perpetrated and the general context within which they occurred that the military operations conducted in April and June 1993 in the Kiseljak enclave were ordered by General Blaskic himself.
i) The combat preparation order and combat order
641. The Trial Chamber will first look at the contents of the combat preparation order 1492 and the combat order 1493 of 17 April 1993. It will next determine to whom the orders were sent and the military assets ordered to be used.
[ ]
b. The recipient of the orders
647. On 17 April 1993, the accused sent the combat preparation order and combat order to Mijo Bozic whom he had previously appointed to the post of Ban Jelacic Brigade commander 1507 . Furthermore, at 16:45 hours on 18 April 1993, Mijo Bozic reported to the accused informing him, amongst other things, that the conflict had spread to Rotilj, Visnjica, Doci, Hercezi and Bretovsko 1508 .
648. It was Mijo Bozic himself who issued a criminal order on 27 January 1993 1509 which read: "After the preparation has been completed the local population is to be called to surrender unconditionally all weapons; otherwise the villages will be burnt to the ground. In case of refusal to surrender arms open strong and concentrated fire on all targets with PAT /anti-aircraft guns/, PAM /anti-aircraft machine guns/, and MB /mortars/ and proceed with mopping up the area" 1510 . It also stated that "Bukovci village must be taken by nightfall on condition that we burn anything standing in our way" 1511 .
649. Despite the fact that Mijo Bozic never carried out this January order, by turning to him in April 1993 to direct military operations designed to "seal off", attack and "cleanse" villages inhabited to a very large extent by civilians, General Blaskic ordered or at least provoked the commission of crimes against Muslims and their property, including the razing of their houses."
"1492 - D299.
1493 - D300.
[ ]
1507 - Witness Blaskic, PT pp. 21699-21700.
1508 - D306.
1509 - General Blaskic was in Kiseljak on the day the order was issued (witness Blaskic, PT pp. 21700-21701).
1510 - P510 (emphasis added).
1511 - P510 (emphasis added)."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, para. 437:
"ii) The accused ordered the attack of 16 April 1993
437. The Trial Chamber finds that the third order 921, dated 16 April at 01:30 hours is very clearly an order to attack. That order, which was addressed in particular to the Viteska brigade, also expressly mentions other units, such as the Military Police Fourth Battalion, the forces of the N. ?. Zrinski unit and the forces of the civilian police which were recognised on the ground as being those which had carried out the attack. The time to commence hostilities which is set out in that order corresponds very precisely to the start of fighting on the ground. Admittedly, the order is presented as "a combat command order to prevent attack activity by the enemy". Accordingly, the attack purportedly formed part of a defensive rather than offensive strategy. However the Trial Chamber has already concluded that no military objective justified that attack. It is therefore unnecessary here to go back over the reasons given for the issue of that order, which, in any event, remains an order to attack. The Trial Chamber considers that that evidence sufficed to show that all those troops, acting in concert, attacked on the accuseds order."
"921 - D269."
M.P.30. Evidence of the mode of combat recommended in an order being actually used on the ground.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, para. 470:
"470. The Trial Chamber further notes that those orders recommend the modes of combat that were actually used on the ground on 16 April. In this way, order D268 stresses co-ordination among the different units. It also asks the forces to take care to ensure that they have total control over fuel consumption, which was one of the main weapons used by the Croatian forces during the attack on 16 April. It is hard to image how the systematic use of petrol as a combat weapon could have been possible in that period of fuel shortage without the approval of the military and/or civilian authorities 979. Order D269 refers to blocking (observation and ambush), search and offensive forces. The main (mountain and valley) roads between Vitez and Zenica were in fact blocked by HVO blocking forces on the morning of 16 April 980, in particular by the Viteska brigade 981. According to witness Landry, the area was subjected to a so-called "cleansing" operation, which was carried out by establishing a cordon outside the village by means of check points on the roads leading to the villages, whilst lighter, more mobile troops , notably search troops, carried out the "cleansing" of the village 982."
"979 - Witness Blaskic, PT p. 22031.
980 - Witness Landry, PT pp. 7508-7509.
981 - Their use was confirmed by order D284 delivered in the night of 16 to 17 April by the accused to the Viteska Brigade; witness Blaskic, PT pp. 18644-18646.
982 - Witness Landry, PT p. 7515."
M.P.31. Evidence of the utterance of the attackers stating that they are acting on orders.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, para. 472:
"472. The testimony of the victims of the massacres tended to show that the civilians were killed in response to orders. Accordingly, witness Fatima Ahmic testified that she heard an HVO soldier in a van say by walkie-talkie: "Yes, the operation was successful, they are lying in front of houses like pigs" 984. When she asked them why they had killed her son, the soldiers said that "it was the force majeure who ordered it the orders came from above" 985 . Witness Abdullah Ahmic testified that he saw a soldier say to another soldier who refused to kill a man: "do as you are ordered"986. Witness Cazim Ahmic testified to what an officer, Ibrica Kupreskic, said to him: "go and run for your life. No Muslim may stay here. If they learn that I let you go, I will be executed" 987. According to witness F, the Dzokeri and the Vitezovi said that they had been given orders to kill all the Muslims so that Muslims would never ever live there again 988. Witness A said that he heard a person named Cicko speak in these terms with regard to the events of 16 April: "everyone is washing their hands now as regards Ahmici , but we all know that Blaskic has ordered that no prisoners of war were of interest to him, only dead bodies" 989.
"984 - Witness Fatima Ahmic PT pp. 3959-3960.
985 - Witness Fatima Ahmic PT p. 3955.
986 - Witness Abdullah Ahmic PT p. 3836.
987 - Witness Cazim Ahmic PT of 1 October 1997 p. 3144.
988 - Witness F.
989 - Witness A, PT p. 5444."
M.3.1.2. Evidence with regard to the weapons and/or military assets employed
M.P.32. Evidence of the systematic use of a combat weapon.
M.P.33. Evidence of the substantial amount of the weapons used.
M.P.34. Evidence of the suspects authority in terms of the use of weapons.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 529-530:
"c. The organized nature of the attacks
529. The crimes described above were committed on a large scale and hence their execution required precise organization, determined by a general command structure . It would in fact have been physically impossible for the Vitezovi, with 60 to 80 men 1158, to have planned and executed operationally the crimes in question on an isolated basis 1159. They could not have procured between 450 and 700 kilograms of explosives which were placed in the booby-trapped lorry without the authorization of General Blaskic, who controlled the Vitez explosives factory 1160 . By the same token, the troops could not have undertaken the attacks on 16 April and 18 July 1993 without obeying the accuseds orders on the operational level or without his assistance. General Blaskic was the only person in Vitez entitled to authorize the use of artillery 1161.
530. As a result, the attack of 16 April 1993, the explosion of the booby-trapped lorry on 18 April 1993 and the attack of 18 July 1993 could not physically have been carried out if General Blaskic had not given the order for their execution or at least allowed them to take place. He was the only one empowered to authorize the use of the assets necessary to carry out those operations. The quantity of arms and explosives used were clear evidence of the accuseds involvement in the organization and planning of those operations. In relation to 16 April 1993, the witness Ellis testified that:
More generally, the work of organising those operations could not have been carried out independently by the small Vitezovi unit. That unit must have had recourse not only to the material available to the accused, but also to an effective command structure, which only General Blaskic could provide. As witness Thomas explained ,
"1158 - PT pp. 24187-24203.
1159 - PT pp. 24210-24211.
1160 - Defence Brief, book 2, p. 21; see also PT p. 24045.
1161 - Witness Blaskic, PT p. 18518.
1162 - Witness Ellis, PT of 30 September 1997, p. 2992.
1163 - Witness Thomas, PT of 24 September 1997, pp. 2679-2680."
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Ildephonse Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR-2000-55, Judgement (TC), 19 June 2012, para. 1507:
1507. Furthermore, when evaluating the impact of Nizeyimanas contribution, the Chamber recalls that Nizeyimanas presence at the Cyahinda Parish necessarily allowed him to examine from military intelligence and operations perspectives the strengths and weaknesses of the displaced Tutsis who had fortified themselves within the parish. It is noteworthy that during the ensuing attack, ESO soldiers utilised specialised arms that could weaken structural safe havens for the refugees within the parish facilities and kill numbers of them from a safe distance. In light of the fact that the primarily Tutsi refugees had previously staved off initial, armed assaults by the bourgmestre and gendarmes, the use of these heavy weapons is not coincidental. Indeed, the Chamber has no doubt that the participation of the ESO soldiers and the weaponry utilised reflect Nizeyimanas on-the-ground assessment of the situation at Cyahinda Parish and were a direct result of Nizeyimanas contributions to the planning and authorisation of this assault. There is no question that Nizeyimanas contributions proved to be both significant and substantial to the ensuing extermination operation.
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, para. 470:
"470. The Trial Chamber further notes that those orders recommend the modes of combat that were actually used on the ground on 16 April. In this way, order D268 stresses co-ordination among the different units. It also asks the forces to take care to ensure that they have total control over fuel consumption, which was one of the main weapons used by the Croatian forces during the attack on 16 April. It is hard to image how the systematic use of petrol as a combat weapon could have been possible in that period of fuel shortage without the approval of the military and/or civilian authorities 979. Order D269 refers to blocking (observation and ambush), search and offensive forces. The main (mountain and valley) roads between Vitez and Zenica were in fact blocked by HVO blocking forces on the morning of 16 April 980, in particular by the Viteska brigade 981. According to witness Landry, the area was subjected to a so-called "cleansing" operation, which was carried out by establishing a cordon outside the village by means of check points on the roads leading to the villages, whilst lighter, more mobile troops , notably search troops, carried out the "cleansing" of the village 982."
"979 - Witness Blaskic, PT p. 22031.
980 - Witness Landry, PT pp. 7508-7509.
981 - Their use was confirmed by order D284 delivered in the night of 16 to 17 April by the accused to the Viteska Brigade; witness Blaskic, PT pp. 18644-18646.
982 - Witness Landry, PT p. 7515."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, para. 471:
"471. The attack started with artillery fire and the Trial Chamber recalls that, according to the accuseds own statements, the use of the artillery was placed under his direct command 983."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 650-651:
"c. Military assets
650. In the second paragraph of the combat order, the accused instructed that "all available artillery" be used and that Gomionica and Svinjarevo be captured "through systematic targeting (60, 82 and 120 mm MB /mortar launchers/)" 1512 . In paragraph 6 of the same order, he also ordered that "fire preparations for the attack must be strong and guarantee a successful attack" 1513 .
651. By advocating the vigorous use of heavy weapons to seize villages inhabited mainly by civilians, General Blaskic gave orders which had consequences out of all proportion to military necessity and knew that many civilians would inevitably be killed and their homes destroyed."
"1512 - D300.
1513 - D300."
M.3.1.3. Evidence of the large-scale and systematic nature of the crimes perpetrated
M.P.36. Evidence of the scale and uniformity of the crimes.
M.P.38. Evidence that all the military units acted in a co-ordinated manner.
M.P.39. Evidence of an entire villages being burned.
M.P.40. Evidence of the houses of an ethnic group being systematically selected as targets.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Ildephonse Nizeyimana, Case No. ICTR-2000-55, Judgement (TC), 19 June 2012, para. 1510-1511:
1510. The Chamber has found that Second Lieutenant Bizimana led a group of ESO soldiers in the killing of Rosalie Gicanda and others taken from her household on or around 20 April 1994. Gicanda, the former Queen of Rwanda, was a Tutsi, although the ethnic identities of the other victims are unproven. Moreover, Bizimana reported this killing to Nizeyimana and the Chamber has concluded that Nizeyimana authorised it.
1511. Given the nature of the attack, the Chamber has no doubt that Gicanda was targeted and intentionally killed because she was a Tutsi. Notably, only days earlier, Bizimana had participated in an operation that led to the murder of members of the Ruhutinyanya family, who were also killed on the basis of their Tutsi ethnicity. Likewise, the murder of Gicanda and others in her household followed President Sindikubwabos 19 April 1994 speech, which marked a significant increase in violence and the targeting of Tutsi civilians within Butare town. The Chamber has no doubt that the murder of Gicanda, referred to as an "old lady" and who was a symbol of the former monarchy, was killed in order to set a striking example that Tutsis, as well as Hutus perceived as sympathetic to the plight of the Tutsis, were the enemy.
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 467-468, 529-530:
"iv) The massive and systematic nature of the crimes as proof that they were committed on orders
467. Lastly, the idea that these crimes could have been committed by uncontrolled elements is impossible to reconcile with the scale and uniformity of the crimes committed on 16 April in the municipality of Vitez. The Trial Chamber adopts the opinion expressed by witness Morsink, a professional soldier acting as an observer for the ECMM at the material time:
The planned nature and, in particular, the fact that all these units acted in a perfectly co-ordinated manner presupposes in fact that those troops were responding to a single command, which accordingly could only be superior to the commander of each of those units.
468. In this connection, it is worth recalling that that was the opinion expressed by the accused himself 976.
"975 - Witness Morsink, PT, p. 9878.
976 - Witness Blaskic, PT p. 19029, pp. 19155-19156 and p. 22020."
"c. The organized nature of the attacks
529. The crimes described above were committed on a large scale and hence their execution required precise organization, determined by a general command structure . It would in fact have been physically impossible for the Vitezovi, with 60 to 80 men 1158, to have planned and executed operationally the crimes in question on an isolated basis 1159. They could not have procured between 450 and 700 kilograms of explosives which were placed in the booby-trapped lorry without the authorization of General Blaskic, who controlled the Vitez explosives factory 1160 . By the same token, the troops could not have undertaken the attacks on 16 April and 18 July 1993 without obeying the accuseds orders on the operational level or without his assistance. General Blaskic was the only person in Vitez entitled to authorize the use of artillery 1161.
530. As a result, the attack of 16 April 1993, the explosion of the booby-trapped lorry on 18 April 1993 and the attack of 18 July 1993 could not physically have been carried out if General Blaskic had not given the order for their execution or at least allowed them to take place. He was the only one empowered to authorize the use of the assets necessary to carry out those operations. The quantity of arms and explosives used were clear evidence of the accuseds involvement in the organization and planning of those operations. In relation to 16 April 1993, the witness Ellis testified that:
More generally, the work of organising those operations could not have been carried out independently by the small Vitezovi unit. That unit must have had recourse not only to the material available to the accused, but also to an effective command structure, which only General Blaskic could provide. As witness Thomas explained ,
"1158 - PT pp. 24187-24203.
1159 - PT pp. 24210-24211.
1160 - Defence Brief, book 2, p. 21; see also PT p. 24045.
1161 - Witness Blaskic, PT p. 18518.
1162 - Witness Ellis, PT of 30 September 1997, p. 2992.
1163 - Witness Thomas, PT of 24 September 1997, pp. 2679-2680."
M.P.44. Evidence of sufficient means of communication.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 654-659:
"ii) The widespread and systematic nature of the crimes perpetrated
654. The Trial Chamber points out that the two aforesaid orders did not initiate all the military operations conducted in Kiseljak in April and June 1993.
655. To start, the Trial Chamber indicates that other orders were sent by the accused to the Ban Jelacic Brigade at the same period, in particular at 18:45 hours 1515 and at 21:40 hours 1516 on 19 April . The former explained inter alia that it was necessary to "attack in groups and only diagonally from Kocatale and Sikulja" 1517 . The latter recalled that Gomionica had to be taken "tonight or in the early morning , because the main forces of the MOS /Muslim armed forces/ are at Busovaca [ ]" 1518 .
656. The Trial Chamber also sets forth that General Blaskic often spoke to his troops . It asserts that even though it was difficult to reach Kiseljak due to the war- time circumstances the HVO army had taken hold of the towns communications buildings and had sufficiently advanced technical means in order to communicate with the officers in the field on a regular basis 1519 . In this connection, the Trial Chamber points out that the combat preparation order demanded a report from the commander of the Ban Jelacic Brigade before 23:30 hours confirming that he was ready to conduct operations. At 23:45 hours, the accused sent out the attack order. It is thereby proved that, contrary to the claims of the accused, the communications between Vitez and Kiseljak were indeed working.
657. Further, as it has affirmed previously, the Trial Chamber is convinced that it does not have all the orders issued by the accused during the period covered by the charges. This is borne out by the irregular numbering of the documents provided to the Trial Chamber by the parties to the hearings.
658. Moreover, the reports which the accused received during the events 1520 and the orders which he issued during 1993, especially those appointing 1521 and dismissing 1522 commanders, persuaded the Trial Chamber that General Blaskic did indeed command military operations in the Kiseljak region and effectively controlled how they developed. In addition, he claimed in a interview for the newspaper Danas in October 1993:
659. More fundamentally and in addition to these important elements, the Trial Chamber holds that the indubitable conclusion to be drawn from the manner in which the offensives progressed and the systematic and widespread nature of the crimes perpetrated is that the military operations of April and June 1993 were ordered at the highest level of the HVO military command by the Central Bosnia Operative Zone commander - General Blaskic. In this regard, the Trial Chamber will recall three striking points already brought out:
"1515 - P456/49.
1516 - P456/50.
1517 - P456/49.
1518 - P456/50.
1519 - Witness Lanthier affirmed that "[...] the HVO had excellent communications among the various locations of its headquarters, particularly the presence of telephones and civilian lines, because the PPT building was under HVO control in Kiseljak and those telephone lines were working so they could use telephones to communicate. They could use faxes. [...] Also, that there were high frequency antennae, and there were also telephones that showed that there were satellite dishes on the roofs of the headquarters. I saw all of that and so they could see that there was a great deal of possibility to maintain communications among the various headquarters, which allowed the commander to exercise commander control over his troops" (PT p. 8333). According to witness Liebert: "[...] what I did see was the what I would say was symptomatic of an effective chain of command and communication system" (PT p. 8797). Witness Morsink also pointed out that the HVO soldiers "[...] had good telephone communications, they had good fax communications, and I saw several HVO officers carrying small portable radios, so I think also the communication part was well-organised. They controlled all the switching stations of the telephone lines, so they could, in fact, decide who was having connections, who not" (PT p. 9909).
1520 - D305, D306, D323.
1521 - Cf. P456/68.
1522 - Cf. P456/53, P456/64, P456/68.
1523 - P380 (emphasis added). The Trial Chamber interprets the statement as a reflection of the actual situation and, not as the Defence preferred, as a propaganda operation to maintain the HVO troops morale."
M.3.1.4. Evidence of the general context of persecution of a civilian population.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 660-661:
"iii) The general context of persecution of the Muslim populations
660. The Trial Chamber observes that the HVO military offensives were merely the ultimate outcome of an overall policy of persecution of the Muslim populations pursued by the Croatian military and political authorities. In agreeing to be the Kiseljak region military commander in April 1992 and then Central Bosnia Operative Zone commander in June of that same year, the accused fully subscribed to this policy from the very moment of his posting.
iv) Conclusions
661. The Trial Chamber is of the view that the content of the military orders sent to the Ban Jelacic Brigade commander, the systematic and widespread aspect of the crimes perpetrated and the general context in which these acts fit permit the assertion that the accused ordered the attacks effected in April and June 1993 against the Muslim villages in the Kiseljak region. It also appears that General Blaskic clearly had to have known that by ordering the Ban Jelacic Brigade to launch such wide-ranging attacks against essentially civilian targets extremely violent crimes would necessarily result. Lastly, it emerges from those same facts that the accused did not pursue a purely military objective but that by using military assets he also sought to implement the policy of persecution of the Muslim civilian populations set by the highest HVO authorities and that, through these offensives, he intended to make the populations in the Kiseljak municipality take flight."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
