Table of contents:
M.4.1. The perpetrator meant to engage in the conduct;
M.P.47. Evidence of the suspect being put on notice of the crimes
M.P.49. Evidence of the period of time during which the suspect had been put on notice of the crimes
M.P.50. Evidence of a strategic plan being communicated/relayed to the suspect's subordinate units
M.P.51. Evidence of the suspect's own statements/utterances
M.4.1.1. Evidence with regard to the orders
M.P.52. Evidence of the categorical and hate engendering content of the orders.
M.P.53. Evidence of the recipient of the orders
M.P.54.1. Evidence of the suspects previous order prohibiting the troops from burning the houses.
M.4.1.2. Evidence with regard to the weapons and/or military assets employed
M.4.1.3. Evidence of the widespread and systematic nature of the crimes perpetrated
M.P.59. Evidence of sufficient means of communication.
M.4.1.4. Evidence of the general context of persecution of a civilian population
M.4.2. The perpetrator meant to cause the consequence of crime; OR
M.4.3.1. Evidence of the suspect's forces being well-functioning and disciplined
M.4.3.3. Evidence of the suspect's own statements/utterances
M.4.3.4. Evidence with regard to the orders
M.P.66. Evidence of the categorical and hate engendering content of the orders.
M.P.67. Evidence of the recipient of the orders
M.P.68.1. Evidence of the suspects previous order prohibiting the troops from burning the houses.
M.4.3.5. Evidence with regard to the weapons and/or military assets employed
M.4.3.6. Evidence of the widespread and systematic nature of the crimes perpetrated
M.P.73. Evidence of sufficient means of communication.
M.4.3.7. Evidence of the general context of persecution of a civilian population
M.4.4. The perpetrator was aware of the circumstance of the crime
Element:
M.4.1. The perpetrator meant to engage in the conduct;
M.P.47. Evidence of the suspect being put on notice of the crimes
M.P.49. Evidence of the period of time during which the suspect had been put on notice of the crimes
M.P.50. Evidence of a strategic plan being communicated/relayed to the suspect's subordinate units
M.P.51. Evidence of the suspect's own statements/utterances
M.4.1.1. Evidence with regard to the orders
M.P.52. Evidence of the categorical and hate engendering content of the orders.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 652-653:
"d. Conclusions
652. Before reaching any conclusions, the Trial Chamber recalls that the attack of April on the villages, especially Svinjarevo, Gomionica and Visnjica, proceeded according to the combat order signed by the accused 1514 heavy artillery fire followed up by infantry sent in to "mop up".
653. The Trial Chamber maintains that even though General Blaskic did not explicitly order the expulsion and killing of the civilian Muslim populations, he deliberately ran the risk of making them and their property the primary targets of the "sealing off" and offensives launched on 18 April 1993. It draws this assertion from the following in particular:
"1514 - D300. Paragraph 10 of the order states: "Begin the operation on 18 April 1993 at 0530 hours"."
M.P.53. Evidence of the recipient of the orders
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 652-653:
"d. Conclusions
652. Before reaching any conclusions, the Trial Chamber recalls that the attack of April on the villages, especially Svinjarevo, Gomionica and Visnjica, proceeded according to the combat order signed by the accused 1514 heavy artillery fire followed up by infantry sent in to "mop up".
653. The Trial Chamber maintains that even though General Blaskic did not explicitly order the expulsion and killing of the civilian Muslim populations, he deliberately ran the risk of making them and their property the primary targets of the "sealing off" and offensives launched on 18 April 1993. It draws this assertion from the following in particular:
"1514 - D300. Paragraph 10 of the order states: "Begin the operation on 18 April 1993 at 0530 hours"."
M.P.54.1. Evidence of the suspects previous order prohibiting the troops from burning the houses.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 474-476:
"vi) The risk taken by the accused
474. Even if doubt were still cast in spite of everything on whether the accused ordered the attack with the clear intention that the massacre would be committed, he would still be liable under Article 7(1) of the Statute for ordering the crimes. As has been explained above 991, any person who, in ordering an act, knows that there is a risk of crimes being committed and accepts that risk, shows the degree of intention necessary (recklessness) so as to incur responsibility for having ordered, planned or incited the commitment of the crimes. In this case, the accused knew that the troops which he had used to carry out the order of attack of 16 April had previously been guilty of many crimes against the Muslim population of Bosnia. The order given by the accused on 4 November 1992 expressly prohibiting the troops from burning the houses 992 proves this. Moreover, the accused admitted before the Trial Chamber that he had been informed about the crimes committed by troops acting in the area for which he was responsible. In particular, the disciplinary reports were forwarded to him 993. Likewise, the accused stated that he asked the Commander of the main general staff and the head of the Defence Department in January 1993 that the independent units be withdrawn from the Central Bosnia Operative Zone on account of the troubles they were causing 994. Furthermore, the accused was aware that there were criminals acting in the ranks of the Military Police 995. Witness Marin, who was a subordinate of the accused at the time, himself acknowledged that there were criminals in the ranks of the Military Police 996. Admittedly, the accused did give an order on 18 January 1993 for the attention of the regular units of the HVO, the independent units and the Military Police Fourth Battalion instructing them to make sure that all soldiers prone to criminal conduct were not in a position to do any harm 997. However, that order remained without effect, even though the accused issued a reminder on 6 February 1993 998. On the contrary , according to the witness Marin the situation deteriorated thereafter 999 . The Defence also presented an order issued by the accused on 17 March 1993 requiring the commanders of all HVO brigades to identify their members who were prone to criminal conduct 1000 . Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber finds that the accused did not ensure himself, before calling on their services on 16 April, that measures had indeed been taken so as to be sure that those criminal elements were not in a position to do any harm. On the contrary, according to the accused it was not until he received the letter from Colonel Stewart on 22 April 1993 that he realised that he could not rely on the reports sent to him by the Military Police commander Ljubicic 1001 . It was not until 30 April that the accused asked the commander of the main staff to replace Pasko Ljubicic and to change the structure of that unit 1002 .
475. The Trial Chamber has further established that the Vitezovi and the Military Police Fourth Battalion took part in the fighting at Busovaca in January 1993 1003 on the accuseds orders.
476. The Trial Chamber further notes that the accused used the Military Police for subsequent operations. In particular, the attack launched against Grbavica on 7 and 8 September 1993 was carried out by the Military Police Seventh Battalion, which took over from the Military Police Fourth Battalion. Consequently, the members of that unit were the same as those who had committed the crimes at Ahmici, as the defence witness Marin acknowledgedb 1004. Admittedly , the accused stated that he had removed the criminal elements once he had obtained overall control of that battalion on 23 July 1993. The accused testified that he sent off a report on 30 April concerning breaches of his orders by the Military Police and asked that disciplinary proceedings be taken against them. He further asked the Supreme Commander of the headquarters general staff to discharge the Commander of the Military Police, Pasko Ljubicic, from his duties. He further claimed that he repeated this request on 29 May and 10 June 1005 . The accused claimed that during the months of June and July, he urged the main staff to make the Military Police subordinate to the Central Bosnia Operative Zone. This request was only granted on 23 July. Pasko Ljubicic was then discharged from his duties and replaced by Marinko Palavra. According to the accused, it was not until this time that elements of the Military Police with criminal records were dismissed 1006."
"991 - See above, discussion on Article 7 of the Statute.
992 - Order of 4 November 1992, D347.
993 - See D204; witness Blaskic, PT pp. 18122-18123.
994 - Witness Blaskic, PT pp. 18126-18127.
995 - Witness Blaskic, PT pp. 18395-18396.
996 - Witness Marin, PT pp. 12080-12081.
997 - Witness Blaskic, PT pp. 18125-18126; witness Marin, PT pp. 12089-12090.
998 - D208.
999 - Witness Marin, PT p. 12091.
1000 - D42, D211 and P456/16: order of 17 March 1993; witness Marin, PT pp. 12103-12105.
1001 - Witness Blaskic, PT pp. 19144-19145.
1002 - Witness Blaskic, PT pp. 19144-19145.
1003 - See discussion above.
1004 - Witness Marin, PT pp. 13705-13706.
1005 - Witness Blaskic, PT pp. 19140-19144."
M.4.1.2. Evidence with regard to the weapons and/or military assets employed
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 650-653:
"c. Military assets
650. In the second paragraph of the combat order, the accused instructed that "all available artillery" be used and that Gomionica and Svinjarevo be captured "through systematic targeting (60, 82 and 120 mm MB /mortar launchers/)" 1512 . In paragraph 6 of the same order, he also ordered that "fire preparations for the attack must be strong and guarantee a successful attack" 1513 .
651. By advocating the vigorous use of heavy weapons to seize villages inhabited mainly by civilians, General Blaskic gave orders which had consequences out of all proportion to military necessity and knew that many civilians would inevitably be killed and their homes destroyed."
"1512 - D300.
1513 - D300."
"d. Conclusions
652. Before reaching any conclusions, the Trial Chamber recalls that the attack of April on the villages, especially Svinjarevo, Gomionica and Visnjica, proceeded according to the combat order signed by the accused 1514 heavy artillery fire followed up by infantry sent in to "mop up".
653. The Trial Chamber maintains that even though General Blaskic did not explicitly order the expulsion and killing of the civilian Muslim populations, he deliberately ran the risk of making them and their property the primary targets of the "sealing off" and offensives launched on 18 April 1993. It draws this assertion from the following in particular:
"1514 - D300. Paragraph 10 of the order states: "Begin the operation on 18 April 1993 at 0530 hours"."
M.4.1.3. Evidence of the widespread and systematic nature of the crimes perpetrated
M.P.59. Evidence of sufficient means of communication.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 654-659, 661:
"ii) The widespread and systematic nature of the crimes perpetrated
654. The Trial Chamber points out that the two aforesaid orders did not initiate all the military operations conducted in Kiseljak in April and June 1993.
655. To start, the Trial Chamber indicates that other orders were sent by the accused to the Ban Jelacic Brigade at the same period, in particular at 18:45 hours 1515 and at 21:40 hours 1516 on 19 April . The former explained inter alia that it was necessary to "attack in groups and only diagonally from Kocatale and Sikulja" 1517 . The latter recalled that Gomionica had to be taken "tonight or in the early morning , because the main forces of the MOS /Muslim armed forces/ are at Busovaca [ ]" 1518 .
656. The Trial Chamber also sets forth that General Blaskic often spoke to his troops . It asserts that even though it was difficult to reach Kiseljak due to the war- time circumstances the HVO army had taken hold of the towns communications buildings and had sufficiently advanced technical means in order to communicate with the officers in the field on a regular basis 1519 . In this connection, the Trial Chamber points out that the combat preparation order demanded a report from the commander of the Ban Jelacic Brigade before 23:30 hours confirming that he was ready to conduct operations. At 23:45 hours, the accused sent out the attack order. It is thereby proved that, contrary to the claims of the accused, the communications between Vitez and Kiseljak were indeed working.
657. Further, as it has affirmed previously, the Trial Chamber is convinced that it does not have all the orders issued by the accused during the period covered by the charges. This is borne out by the irregular numbering of the documents provided to the Trial Chamber by the parties to the hearings.
658. Moreover, the reports which the accused received during the events 1520 and the orders which he issued during 1993, especially those appointing 1521 and dismissing 1522 commanders, persuaded the Trial Chamber that General Blaskic did indeed command military operations in the Kiseljak region and effectively controlled how they developed. In addition, he claimed in a interview for the newspaper Danas in October 1993:
659. More fundamentally and in addition to these important elements, the Trial Chamber holds that the indubitable conclusion to be drawn from the manner in which the offensives progressed and the systematic and widespread nature of the crimes perpetrated is that the military operations of April and June 1993 were ordered at the highest level of the HVO military command by the Central Bosnia Operative Zone commander - General Blaskic. In this regard, the Trial Chamber will recall three striking points already brought out:
[ ]
iv) Conclusions
661. The Trial Chamber is of the view that the content of the military orders sent to the Ban Jelacic Brigade commander, the systematic and widespread aspect of the crimes perpetrated and the general context in which these acts fit permit the assertion that the accused ordered the attacks effected in April and June 1993 against the Muslim villages in the Kiseljak region. It also appears that General Blaskic clearly had to have known that by ordering the Ban Jelacic Brigade to launch such wide-ranging attacks against essentially civilian targets extremely violent crimes would necessarily result. Lastly, it emerges from those same facts that the accused did not pursue a purely military objective but that by using military assets he also sought to implement the policy of persecution of the Muslim civilian populations set by the highest HVO authorities and that, through these offensives, he intended to make the populations in the Kiseljak municipality take flight."
"1515 - P456/49.
1516 - P456/50.
1517 - P456/49.
1518 - P456/50.
1519 - Witness Lanthier affirmed that "[...] the HVO had excellent communications among the various locations of its headquarters, particularly the presence of telephones and civilian lines, because the PPT building was under HVO control in Kiseljak and those telephone lines were working so they could use telephones to communicate. They could use faxes. [...] Also, that there were high frequency antennae, and there were also telephones that showed that there were satellite dishes on the roofs of the headquarters. I saw all of that and so they could see that there was a great deal of possibility to maintain communications among the various headquarters, which allowed the commander to exercise commander control over his troops" (PT p. 8333). According to witness Liebert: "[...] what I did see was the what I would say was symptomatic of an effective chain of command and communication system" (PT p. 8797). Witness Morsink also pointed out that the HVO soldiers "[...] had good telephone communications, they had good fax communications, and I saw several HVO officers carrying small portable radios, so I think also the communication part was well-organised. They controlled all the switching stations of the telephone lines, so they could, in fact, decide who was having connections, who not" (PT p. 9909).
1520 - D305, D306, D323.
1521 - Cf. P456/68.
1522 - Cf. P456/53, P456/64, P456/68.
1523 - P380 (emphasis added). The Trial Chamber interprets the statement as a reflection of the actual situation and, not as the Defence preferred, as a propaganda operation to maintain the HVO troops morale."
M.4.1.4. Evidence of the general context of persecution of a civilian population
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 660-661:
"iii) The general context of persecution of the Muslim populations
660. The Trial Chamber observes that the HVO military offensives were merely the ultimate outcome of an overall policy of persecution of the Muslim populations pursued by the Croatian military and political authorities. In agreeing to be the Kiseljak region military commander in April 1992 and then Central Bosnia Operative Zone commander in June of that same year, the accused fully subscribed to this policy from the very moment of his posting.
iv) Conclusions
661. The Trial Chamber is of the view that the content of the military orders sent to the Ban Jelacic Brigade commander, the systematic and widespread aspect of the crimes perpetrated and the general context in which these acts fit permit the assertion that the accused ordered the attacks effected in April and June 1993 against the Muslim villages in the Kiseljak region. It also appears that General Blaskic clearly had to have known that by ordering the Ban Jelacic Brigade to launch such wide-ranging attacks against essentially civilian targets extremely violent crimes would necessarily result. Lastly, it emerges from those same facts that the accused did not pursue a purely military objective but that by using military assets he also sought to implement the policy of persecution of the Muslim civilian populations set by the highest HVO authorities and that, through these offensives, he intended to make the populations in the Kiseljak municipality take flight."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
M.4.2. The perpetrator meant to cause the consequence of crime; OR
M.4.3.1. Evidence of the suspect's forces being well-functioning and disciplined
M.4.3.3. Evidence of the suspect's own statements/utterances
M.4.3.4. Evidence with regard to the orders
M.P.66. Evidence of the categorical and hate engendering content of the orders.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 652-653:
"d. Conclusions
652. Before reaching any conclusions, the Trial Chamber recalls that the attack of April on the villages, especially Svinjarevo, Gomionica and Visnjica, proceeded according to the combat order signed by the accused 1514 heavy artillery fire followed up by infantry sent in to "mop up".
653. The Trial Chamber maintains that even though General Blaskic did not explicitly order the expulsion and killing of the civilian Muslim populations, he deliberately ran the risk of making them and their property the primary targets of the "sealing off" and offensives launched on 18 April 1993. It draws this assertion from the following in particular:
"1514 - D300. Paragraph 10 of the order states: "Begin the operation on 18 April 1993 at 0530 hours"."
M.P.67. Evidence of the recipient of the orders
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 652-653:
"d. Conclusions
652. Before reaching any conclusions, the Trial Chamber recalls that the attack of April on the villages, especially Svinjarevo, Gomionica and Visnjica, proceeded according to the combat order signed by the accused 1514 heavy artillery fire followed up by infantry sent in to "mop up".
653. The Trial Chamber maintains that even though General Blaskic did not explicitly order the expulsion and killing of the civilian Muslim populations, he deliberately ran the risk of making them and their property the primary targets of the "sealing off" and offensives launched on 18 April 1993. It draws this assertion from the following in particular:
"1514 - D300. Paragraph 10 of the order states: "Begin the operation on 18 April 1993 at 0530 hours"."
M.P.68.1. Evidence of the suspects previous order prohibiting the troops from burning the houses.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 474-476:
"vi) The risk taken by the accused
474. Even if doubt were still cast in spite of everything on whether the accused ordered the attack with the clear intention that the massacre would be committed, he would still be liable under Article 7(1) of the Statute for ordering the crimes. As has been explained above 991, any person who, in ordering an act, knows that there is a risk of crimes being committed and accepts that risk, shows the degree of intention necessary (recklessness) so as to incur responsibility for having ordered, planned or incited the commitment of the crimes. In this case, the accused knew that the troops which he had used to carry out the order of attack of 16 April had previously been guilty of many crimes against the Muslim population of Bosnia. The order given by the accused on 4 November 1992 expressly prohibiting the troops from burning the houses 992 proves this. Moreover, the accused admitted before the Trial Chamber that he had been informed about the crimes committed by troops acting in the area for which he was responsible. In particular, the disciplinary reports were forwarded to him 993. Likewise, the accused stated that he asked the Commander of the main general staff and the head of the Defence Department in January 1993 that the independent units be withdrawn from the Central Bosnia Operative Zone on account of the troubles they were causing 994. Furthermore, the accused was aware that there were criminals acting in the ranks of the Military Police 995. Witness Marin, who was a subordinate of the accused at the time, himself acknowledged that there were criminals in the ranks of the Military Police 996. Admittedly, the accused did give an order on 18 January 1993 for the attention of the regular units of the HVO, the independent units and the Military Police Fourth Battalion instructing them to make sure that all soldiers prone to criminal conduct were not in a position to do any harm 997. However, that order remained without effect, even though the accused issued a reminder on 6 February 1993 998. On the contrary , according to the witness Marin the situation deteriorated thereafter 999 . The Defence also presented an order issued by the accused on 17 March 1993 requiring the commanders of all HVO brigades to identify their members who were prone to criminal conduct 1000 . Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber finds that the accused did not ensure himself, before calling on their services on 16 April, that measures had indeed been taken so as to be sure that those criminal elements were not in a position to do any harm. On the contrary, according to the accused it was not until he received the letter from Colonel Stewart on 22 April 1993 that he realised that he could not rely on the reports sent to him by the Military Police commander Ljubicic 1001 . It was not until 30 April that the accused asked the commander of the main staff to replace Pasko Ljubicic and to change the structure of that unit 1002 .
475. The Trial Chamber has further established that the Vitezovi and the Military Police Fourth Battalion took part in the fighting at Busovaca in January 1993 1003 on the accuseds orders.
476. The Trial Chamber further notes that the accused used the Military Police for subsequent operations. In particular, the attack launched against Grbavica on 7 and 8 September 1993 was carried out by the Military Police Seventh Battalion, which took over from the Military Police Fourth Battalion. Consequently, the members of that unit were the same as those who had committed the crimes at Ahmici, as the defence witness Marin acknowledgedb 1004. Admittedly , the accused stated that he had removed the criminal elements once he had obtained overall control of that battalion on 23 July 1993. The accused testified that he sent off a report on 30 April concerning breaches of his orders by the Military Police and asked that disciplinary proceedings be taken against them. He further asked the Supreme Commander of the headquarters general staff to discharge the Commander of the Military Police, Pasko Ljubicic, from his duties. He further claimed that he repeated this request on 29 May and 10 June 1005 . The accused claimed that during the months of June and July, he urged the main staff to make the Military Police subordinate to the Central Bosnia Operative Zone. This request was only granted on 23 July. Pasko Ljubicic was then discharged from his duties and replaced by Marinko Palavra. According to the accused, it was not until this time that elements of the Military Police with criminal records were dismissed 1006."
"991 - See above, discussion on Article 7 of the Statute.
992 - Order of 4 November 1992, D347.
993 - See D204; witness Blaskic, PT pp. 18122-18123.
994 - Witness Blaskic, PT pp. 18126-18127.
995 - Witness Blaskic, PT pp. 18395-18396.
996 - Witness Marin, PT pp. 12080-12081.
997 - Witness Blaskic, PT pp. 18125-18126; witness Marin, PT pp. 12089-12090.
998 - D208.
999 - Witness Marin, PT p. 12091.
1000 - D42, D211 and P456/16: order of 17 March 1993; witness Marin, PT pp. 12103-12105.
1001 - Witness Blaskic, PT pp. 19144-19145.
1002 - Witness Blaskic, PT pp. 19144-19145.
1003 - See discussion above.
1004 - Witness Marin, PT pp. 13705-13706.
1005 - Witness Blaskic, PT pp. 19140-19144."
M.4.3.5. Evidence with regard to the weapons and/or military assets employed
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 650-653:
"c. Military assets
650. In the second paragraph of the combat order, the accused instructed that "all available artillery" be used and that Gomionica and Svinjarevo be captured "through systematic targeting (60, 82 and 120 mm MB /mortar launchers/)" 1512 . In paragraph 6 of the same order, he also ordered that "fire preparations for the attack must be strong and guarantee a successful attack" 1513 .
651. By advocating the vigorous use of heavy weapons to seize villages inhabited mainly by civilians, General Blaskic gave orders which had consequences out of all proportion to military necessity and knew that many civilians would inevitably be killed and their homes destroyed."
"1512 - D300.
1513 - D300."
"d. Conclusions
652. Before reaching any conclusions, the Trial Chamber recalls that the attack of April on the villages, especially Svinjarevo, Gomionica and Visnjica, proceeded according to the combat order signed by the accused 1514 heavy artillery fire followed up by infantry sent in to "mop up".
653. The Trial Chamber maintains that even though General Blaskic did not explicitly order the expulsion and killing of the civilian Muslim populations, he deliberately ran the risk of making them and their property the primary targets of the "sealing off" and offensives launched on 18 April 1993. It draws this assertion from the following in particular:
"1514 - D300. Paragraph 10 of the order states: "Begin the operation on 18 April 1993 at 0530 hours"."
M.4.3.6. Evidence of the widespread and systematic nature of the crimes perpetrated
M.P.73. Evidence of sufficient means of communication.
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 654-659, 661:
"ii) The widespread and systematic nature of the crimes perpetrated
654. The Trial Chamber points out that the two aforesaid orders did not initiate all the military operations conducted in Kiseljak in April and June 1993.
655. To start, the Trial Chamber indicates that other orders were sent by the accused to the Ban Jelacic Brigade at the same period, in particular at 18:45 hours 1515 and at 21:40 hours 1516 on 19 April . The former explained inter alia that it was necessary to "attack in groups and only diagonally from Kocatale and Sikulja" 1517 . The latter recalled that Gomionica had to be taken "tonight or in the early morning , because the main forces of the MOS /Muslim armed forces/ are at Busovaca [ ]" 1518 .
656. The Trial Chamber also sets forth that General Blaskic often spoke to his troops . It asserts that even though it was difficult to reach Kiseljak due to the war- time circumstances the HVO army had taken hold of the towns communications buildings and had sufficiently advanced technical means in order to communicate with the officers in the field on a regular basis 1519 . In this connection, the Trial Chamber points out that the combat preparation order demanded a report from the commander of the Ban Jelacic Brigade before 23:30 hours confirming that he was ready to conduct operations. At 23:45 hours, the accused sent out the attack order. It is thereby proved that, contrary to the claims of the accused, the communications between Vitez and Kiseljak were indeed working.
657. Further, as it has affirmed previously, the Trial Chamber is convinced that it does not have all the orders issued by the accused during the period covered by the charges. This is borne out by the irregular numbering of the documents provided to the Trial Chamber by the parties to the hearings.
658. Moreover, the reports which the accused received during the events 1520 and the orders which he issued during 1993, especially those appointing 1521 and dismissing 1522 commanders, persuaded the Trial Chamber that General Blaskic did indeed command military operations in the Kiseljak region and effectively controlled how they developed. In addition, he claimed in a interview for the newspaper Danas in October 1993:
659. More fundamentally and in addition to these important elements, the Trial Chamber holds that the indubitable conclusion to be drawn from the manner in which the offensives progressed and the systematic and widespread nature of the crimes perpetrated is that the military operations of April and June 1993 were ordered at the highest level of the HVO military command by the Central Bosnia Operative Zone commander - General Blaskic. In this regard, the Trial Chamber will recall three striking points already brought out:
[ ]
iv) Conclusions
661. The Trial Chamber is of the view that the content of the military orders sent to the Ban Jelacic Brigade commander, the systematic and widespread aspect of the crimes perpetrated and the general context in which these acts fit permit the assertion that the accused ordered the attacks effected in April and June 1993 against the Muslim villages in the Kiseljak region. It also appears that General Blaskic clearly had to have known that by ordering the Ban Jelacic Brigade to launch such wide-ranging attacks against essentially civilian targets extremely violent crimes would necessarily result. Lastly, it emerges from those same facts that the accused did not pursue a purely military objective but that by using military assets he also sought to implement the policy of persecution of the Muslim civilian populations set by the highest HVO authorities and that, through these offensives, he intended to make the populations in the Kiseljak municipality take flight."
"1515 - P456/49.
1516 - P456/50.
1517 - P456/49.
1518 - P456/50.
1519 - Witness Lanthier affirmed that "[...] the HVO had excellent communications among the various locations of its headquarters, particularly the presence of telephones and civilian lines, because the PPT building was under HVO control in Kiseljak and those telephone lines were working so they could use telephones to communicate. They could use faxes. [...] Also, that there were high frequency antennae, and there were also telephones that showed that there were satellite dishes on the roofs of the headquarters. I saw all of that and so they could see that there was a great deal of possibility to maintain communications among the various headquarters, which allowed the commander to exercise commander control over his troops" (PT p. 8333). According to witness Liebert: "[...] what I did see was the what I would say was symptomatic of an effective chain of command and communication system" (PT p. 8797). Witness Morsink also pointed out that the HVO soldiers "[...] had good telephone communications, they had good fax communications, and I saw several HVO officers carrying small portable radios, so I think also the communication part was well-organised. They controlled all the switching stations of the telephone lines, so they could, in fact, decide who was having connections, who not" (PT p. 9909).
1520 - D305, D306, D323.
1521 - Cf. P456/68.
1522 - Cf. P456/53, P456/64, P456/68.
1523 - P380 (emphasis added). The Trial Chamber interprets the statement as a reflection of the actual situation and, not as the Defence preferred, as a propaganda operation to maintain the HVO troops morale."
M.4.3.7. Evidence of the general context of persecution of a civilian population
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blakić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (TC), 3 March 2000, paras. 660-661:
"iii) The general context of persecution of the Muslim populations
660. The Trial Chamber observes that the HVO military offensives were merely the ultimate outcome of an overall policy of persecution of the Muslim populations pursued by the Croatian military and political authorities. In agreeing to be the Kiseljak region military commander in April 1992 and then Central Bosnia Operative Zone commander in June of that same year, the accused fully subscribed to this policy from the very moment of his posting.
iv) Conclusions
661. The Trial Chamber is of the view that the content of the military orders sent to the Ban Jelacic Brigade commander, the systematic and widespread aspect of the crimes perpetrated and the general context in which these acts fit permit the assertion that the accused ordered the attacks effected in April and June 1993 against the Muslim villages in the Kiseljak region. It also appears that General Blaskic clearly had to have known that by ordering the Ban Jelacic Brigade to launch such wide-ranging attacks against essentially civilian targets extremely violent crimes would necessarily result. Lastly, it emerges from those same facts that the accused did not pursue a purely military objective but that by using military assets he also sought to implement the policy of persecution of the Muslim civilian populations set by the highest HVO authorities and that, through these offensives, he intended to make the populations in the Kiseljak municipality take flight."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
M.4.4. The perpetrator was aware of the circumstance of the crime
