Table of contents:
M.2.1. Act or omission of prompting another person to attempt or commit the crime
M.P.1. Evidence of the suspect’s inflammatory and discriminatory statements
M.P.1.5. Evidence of the suspect’s statement encouraging a crowd to rape members of a group
M.P.1.6. Evidence of entering into agreement as part of conspiracy to commit genocide
M.P.2. Evidence of the suspect’s presence at the site of the killing
M.P.3. Evidence of the suspect’s immediate response to the killing
M.P.5. Evidence of the closeness in time and space between the instigation and the crimes
M.P.5.1. Evidence of the suspect’s statement being immediately acted upon
M.P.6. Evidence of decisions of a high command being systematically implemented by subsidiary organs
M.P.8. Evidence of the principal perpetrators’ presence during the suspect’s statement
M.P.9. Evidence of the authority/influence of the suspect
M.P.9.1. Evidence of the assailant's statement that he had been given permission to rape
Element:
M.2.1. Act or omission of prompting another person to attempt or commit the crime
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement (TC), 1 September 2004, para. 269:
"269. Instigating means prompting another to commit an offence. Both acts and omissions may constitute instigating, which covers express as well as implied conduct. The nexus between instigation and perpetration requires proof. It is not necessary to demonstrate that the crime would not have been perpetrated without the accused’s involvement; it is sufficient to prove that the instigation was a factor clearly contributing to the conduct of other persons committing the crime in question. It has further to be demonstrated that the accused intended to provoke or induce the commission of the crime, or was aware of the substantial likelihood that the commission of a crime would be a probable consequence of his acts."
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement (TC), 5 December 2003, para. 168:
"168. […] Instigating" means prompting another to commit an offence, which is actually committed.281 It is sufficient to demonstrate that the instigation was "a clear contributing factor to the conduct of other person(s)."282 It is not necessary to demonstrate that the crime would not have occurred without the accused’s involvement.283 […]"
"281 - Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 482; Blakic Trial Judgement, para. 280; Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 387.
282 - Kvocka Trial Judgement, para. 252, citing Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 387.
283 - Kvocka Trial Judgement, para. 252, citing Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 387."
M.P.1. Evidence of the suspect’s inflammatory and discriminatory statements
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement (TC), 1 September 2004, paras. 359-360:
"3. Instigating
359. Many of the decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff for which the Accused bears responsibility requested that certain acts amounting to crimes be carried out. Most of the decisions did not take immediate effect and required implementation by, e.g., municipal organs. In this context, it is immaterial whether the physical perpetrators were subordinate to the instigator, or whether a number of other persons would necessarily have to be involved before the crime was actually committed, as long as it can be shown that there was a causal link between an act of instigation and the commission of a particular crime. Causality needs to be established between all acts of instigation and the acts committed by the physical perpetrators, even where the former are the public utterances of the Accused.
360. The Trial Chamber has found that decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff regarding the disarmament, dismissal and resettlement of non-Serbs were systematically implemented by the municipal Crisis Staffs, the local police, and the military. Moreover, it has been abundantly proved that the Accused made several inflammatory and discriminatory statements, inter alia, advocating the dismissal of non-Serbs from employment, and stating that only a few non-Serbs would be permitted to stay on the territory of the ARK. In light of the various positions of authority held by the Accused throughout the relevant time, these statements could only be understood by the physical perpetrators as a direct invitation and a prompting to commit crimes. Against this background, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused instigated the commission of some crimes charged in the Indictment."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T, Judgement (TC), 22 January 2004, paras. 375, 637, 648-652:
"375. Prosecution Witness GEP testified that after Kamuhanda had finished speaking to a man, one of the passengers in the vehicle he had come in shot the man dead. On cross-examination, the Witness stated that people there said that the person shot was a Protestant Priest called "Bucundura", whom she did not know. On cross-examination, she also stated that Kamuhanda had a discussion with the pastor before they killed Bucundura. The Witness stated Kamuhanda said nothing after the man was killed, but turned around and, as their leader, told the others, "Start working", so as to incite them to kill.
[…]
637. The Chamber has found that at a meeting occurring sometime between 6 April 1994 and 10 April 1994, at the home of his cousins in Gikomero commune, the Accused addressed those present, incited them to start killing Tutsi, and distributed grenades, machetes and guns to them to use and to further distribute. He also told the participants that he would return to see if they had started the killings, or so that the killings could start.
[…]
o Individual Criminal Responsibility of the Accused (Article 6.1 of the Statute)
648. On the basis of its factual findings and legal findings above, the Chamber finds that the Accused participated in the killings in Gikomero Parish Compound in Gikomero commune by ordering Interahamwe, soldiers, and policemen to kill members of the Tutsi ethnic group, instigating other assailants to kill members of the Tutsi ethnic group and by aiding and abetting in the commission of the crime through the distribution of weapons and by leading the attackers to the Gikomero Parish Compound.
649. Judge Maqutu joins with the Majority to conclude that the Accused participated in the crime by ordering these killings, but his reasoning differs from that of the Majority. This reasoning is explained in his Separate and Concurring Opinion on the Verdict.
650. The Chamber finds that at the time of his participation in these killings, the Accused had the intent to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group in whole or in part.
d. Conclusion
651. In conclusion, the Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the Accused is individually criminally responsible for instigating, ordering, and aiding and abetting the killing of members of the Tutsi ethnic group in Gikomero Parish Compound, Gikomero commune, Kigali-Rural préfecture, pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute.
652. Accordingly, in relation to Count 2 of the Indictment, the Chamber finds the Accused GUILTY of GENOCIDE."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
M.P.1.5. Evidence of the suspect’s statement encouraging a crowd to rape members of a group
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No, ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement (TC), 15 May 2003, paras. 475-479:
"6. Count 10: Rape
475. Count 10 charges:
By his acts in relation to the events described in paragraph 3.17 above, Laurent SEMANZA is responsible for the RAPE of Victim A and Victim B as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population on political, ethnic or racial grounds, and has thereby committed CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY stipulated in Article 3(g) of the Statute of the Tribunal as a crime, attributed to him by virtue of Articles 6(1) and 6(3), and punishable in reference to Articles 22 and 23 of the same Statute.
476. The Chamber has found, in relation to paragraph 3.17 of the Indictment, that the Accused, in the presence of commune and military authorities, addressed a crowd and asked them how their work of killing the Tutsis was progressing and then encouraged them to rape Tutsi women before killing them. Immediately thereafter, one of the men from the crowd had non-consensual sexual intercourse with Victim A, who was hiding in a nearby home. The Chamber has found that Victim B was killed by two other men from this crowd, but has had insufficient evidence to draw any conclusions about whether she had also been raped.
477. The Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Victim A was raped by one of the assailants who heard the Accused encouraging the crowd to rape Tutsi women. In light of the generalized instructions about raping and killing Tutsis, the ethnic group targeted by the widespread attack, and the fact that the assailant arrived at Victim A's hiding place with two others who then killed Victim B, the Chamber finds that this rape was part of the widespread attack against the civilian Tutsi population and that the assailant was so aware. The Chamber therefore finds that the principal perpetrator committed rape as a crime against humanity.
478. Having regard, inter alia, to the influence of the Accused and to the fact that the rape of Victim A occurred directly after the Accused instructed the group to rape, the Chamber finds that the Accused's encouragement constituted instigation because it was causally connected and substantially contributed to the actions of the principal perpetrator. The assailant's statement that he had been given permission to rape Victim A is evidence of a clear link between the Accused's statement and the crime. The Chamber also finds that the Accused made his statement intentionally with the awareness that he was influencing the perpetrator to commit the crime.
479. The Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the Accused instigated the rape of Victim A as a crime against humanity. Therefore, the Chamber finds the Accused guilty on Count 10."
M.P.1.6. Evidence of entering into agreement as part of conspiracy to commit genocide.
Prosecutor v. Zdravko Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-A, Judgement (AC), 8 April 2015, para. 587:
''587. In relation to Tolimir’s argument that he should not have been convicted under Article 4(3)(b) of the Statute because there is no finding or evidence on the record that he had any communications with any of the alleged members of the JCE to Murder, the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber did not specifically rely upon its prior findings on Tolimir’s communications with the alleged members of the JCE to Murder to establish his entering the conspiracy to genocide.1786 Nor was the Trial Chamber required to do so: as explained above, if direct evidence of entering into an agreement is lacking, the actus reus of the crime of conspiracy under Article 4(3)(b) of the Statute may be established on the basis of the totality of the evidence on the record, as long as it is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from such evidence.1787''
1786 See Trial Judgement, para. 1176.
1787 See supra, para. 583.
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
M.P.2. Evidence of the suspect’s presence at the site of the killing
M.P.3. Evidence of the suspect’s immediate response to the killing
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement (TC), 1 September 2004, para. 269:
"269. Instigating means prompting another to commit an offence. Both acts and omissions may constitute instigating, which covers express as well as implied conduct. The nexus between instigation and perpetration requires proof. It is not necessary to demonstrate that the crime would not have been perpetrated without the accused’s involvement; it is sufficient to prove that the instigation was a factor clearly contributing to the conduct of other persons committing the crime in question. It has further to be demonstrated that the accused intended to provoke or induce the commission of the crime, or was aware of the substantial likelihood that the commission of a crime would be a probable consequence of his acts."
Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T, Judgement (TC), 22 January 2004, paras. 375, 637 and 648-652:
"375. Prosecution Witness GEP testified that after Kamuhanda had finished speaking to a man, one of the passengers in the vehicle he had come in shot the man dead. On cross-examination, the Witness stated that people there said that the person shot was a Protestant Priest called "Bucundura", whom she did not know. On cross-examination, she also stated that Kamuhanda had a discussion with the pastor before they killed Bucundura. The Witness stated Kamuhanda said nothing after the man was killed, but turned around and, as their leader, told the others, "Start working", so as to incite them to kill.
[…]
637. The Chamber has found that at a meeting occurring sometime between 6 April 1994 and 10 April 1994, at the home of his cousins in Gikomero commune, the Accused addressed those present, incited them to start killing Tutsi, and distributed grenades, machetes and guns to them to use and to further distribute. He also told the participants that he would return to see if they had started the killings, or so that the killings could start.
[…]
o Individual Criminal Responsibility of the Accused (Article 6.1 of the Statute)
648. On the basis of its factual findings and legal findings above, the Chamber finds that the Accused participated in the killings in Gikomero Parish Compound in Gikomero commune by ordering Interahamwe, soldiers, and policemen to kill members of the Tutsi ethnic group, instigating other assailants to kill members of the Tutsi ethnic group and by aiding and abetting in the commission of the crime through the distribution of weapons and by leading the attackers to the Gikomero Parish Compound.
649. Judge Maqutu joins with the Majority to conclude that the Accused participated in the crime by ordering these killings, but his reasoning differs from that of the Majority. This reasoning is explained in his Separate and Concurring Opinion on the Verdict.
650. The Chamber finds that at the time of his participation in these killings, the Accused had the intent to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group in whole or in part.
d. Conclusion
651. In conclusion, the Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the Accused is individually criminally responsible for instigating, ordering, and aiding and abetting the killing of members of the Tutsi ethnic group in Gikomero Parish Compound, Gikomero commune, Kigali-Rural préfecture, pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Statute.
652. Accordingly, in relation to Count 2 of the Indictment, the Chamber finds the Accused GUILTY of GENOCIDE."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement (TC), 5 December 2003, para. 168:
"168. […] It has been held in relation to "instigating" that omissions amount to instigation in circumstances where a commander has created an environment permissive of criminal behaviour by subordinates. […]"
"289 - Blaskic Trial Judgement, para. 337."
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement (TC), 1 September 2004, para. 269:
"269. Instigating means prompting another to commit an offence. Both acts and omissions may constitute instigating, which covers express as well as implied conduct. The nexus between instigation and perpetration requires proof. It is not necessary to demonstrate that the crime would not have been perpetrated without the accused’s involvement; it is sufficient to prove that the instigation was a factor clearly contributing to the conduct of other persons committing the crime in question. It has further to be demonstrated that the accused intended to provoke or induce the commission of the crime, or was aware of the substantial likelihood that the commission of a crime would be a probable consequence of his acts."
"86. The jurisprudence of the Tribunal has established that a causal link between the act of instigation and the physical perpetration of a crime needs to be demonstrated as part of the actus reus. This link, however, need not be such as to show that the offence would not have been perpetrated without the participation of the instigator."
Prosecutor v. Jean de Dieu Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T, Judgement (TC), 22 January 2004, para. 593:
"(ii) Instigating
593. "Instigating", involves prompting another person to commit an offence, and needs not be direct or public. Both positive acts and omissions may constitute instigation. Instigation is punishable on proof of a causal connection between the instigation and the commission of the crime."
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgement (TC), 5 December 2003, para. 168:
"168. Instigating" means prompting another to commit an offence, which is actually committed.281 It is sufficient to demonstrate that the instigation was "a clear contributing factor to the conduct of other person(s)."282 It is not necessary to demonstrate that the crime would not have occurred without the accused’s involvement.283"
"281 - Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 482; Blakic Trial Judgement, para. 280; Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 387.
282 - Kvocka Trial Judgement, para. 252, citing Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 387.
283 - Kvocka Trial Judgement, para. 252, citing Kordic Trial Judgement, para. 387."
M.P.5. Evidence of the closeness in time and space between the instigation and the crimes
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgement (TC), 17 June 2004, paras. 227-228:
"227. In light of the closeness in time and space between the instigation by the Accused on 17 April 1994 and the rapes committed against Witness TAQ and other women and girls, the mode of commission of which amounted to instigation, the Chamber finds that the rapes were a direct consequence of instigation. However, the Chamber is unpersuaded that there is a sufficient nexus between such instigation and the other rapes, the commission of which has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Although it is true that Prosecution Witness TAS testified that an attacker told her that he was acting in accordance with the Accused's instructions, the Chamber has not found any evidence that this part of her account is reliable.
228. With regard to paragraphs 20 and 37 of the Indictment, and in light of the evidence adduced in respect of paragraphs 39 and 40 of the same Indictment, the Chamber finds that the Prosecutor has established beyond a reasonable doubt that, from April to June 1994, in Rusumo commune, rapes and other acts of sexual violence were committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against Tutsi civilians. The Chamber finds that the Accused knew or had reason to know that such rapes were being committed because he instigated the attack against Tutsi civilians."
M.P.5.1. Evidence of the suspect’s statement being immediately acted upon
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No, ICTR-97-20-A, Judgement (AC), 20 May 2005, paras. 289-290:
289. The Appellant asserts that he was wrongly convicted on Counts 10-12 and 14 and that the language in which he allegedly told the Interahamwe to commit the crimes detailed in those counts was not made out at trial or even set out in the Indictment.625 However, it is not necessary to charge and prove the "exact" language used by an accused. Here, paragraph 3.17 of the Indictment described in sufficient detail the contents of the statements of the Appellant 626 and there was evidence to make out this allegation. 627 The Appellant has not demonstrated that the Trial Chamber erred in this regard.
290. Finally, the Appellant -- purportedly drawing on the Akayesu Trial Judgement -- seems to suggest that, even if his statements were made out, they would still only establish that he incited the crimes rather than instigating them. 628 However, the Trial Chamber's holding that the Appellant instigated the rape of Victim A and the murder of Victim B was based on its finding that the Appellant's words had been immediately acted upon. 629 The Appellant has not shown that this finding was in error.
"625. Semanza Appeal Brief, para. 338.
626. Paragraph 3.17 of the Indictment states: "Laurent SEMANZA spoke to a small group of men in Gikoro Commune. He told them that they had killed Tutsi women but that they must also rape them before killing them. In response to Semanza's words the same men immediately went to where two Tutsi women, Victim A and Victim B, had taken refuge. One of the men raped Victim A and two men raped and murdered Victim B."
627. Trial Judgement, paras 253 (referring to T. 29 March 2001, pp. 9, 33-35) and 261.
628. Semanza Appeal Brief, para. 340.
629. Trial Judgement, para. 261."
Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No, ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement (TC), 15 May 2003, paras. 475-479, 492:
"6. Count 10: Rape
475. Count 10 charges:
By his acts in relation to the events described in paragraph 3.17 above, Laurent SEMANZA is responsible for the RAPE of Victim A and Victim B as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population on political, ethnic or racial grounds, and has thereby committed CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY stipulated in Article 3(g) of the Statute of the Tribunal as a crime, attributed to him by virtue of Articles 6(1) and 6(3), and punishable in reference to Articles 22 and 23 of the same Statute.
476. The Chamber has found, in relation to paragraph 3.17 of the Indictment, that the Accused, in the presence of commune and military authorities, addressed a crowd and asked them how their work of killing the Tutsis was progressing and then encouraged them to rape Tutsi women before killing them. Immediately thereafter, one of the men from the crowd had non-consensual sexual intercourse with Victim A, who was hiding in a nearby home. The Chamber has found that Victim B was killed by two other men from this crowd, but has had insufficient evidence to draw any conclusions about whether she had also been raped.
477. The Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Victim A was raped by one of the assailants who heard the Accused encouraging the crowd to rape Tutsi women. In light of the generalized instructions about raping and killing Tutsis, the ethnic group targeted by the widespread attack, and the fact that the assailant arrived at Victim A's hiding place with two others who then killed Victim B, the Chamber finds that this rape was part of the widespread attack against the civilian Tutsi population and that the assailant was so aware. The Chamber therefore finds that the principal perpetrator committed rape as a crime against humanity.
478. Having regard, inter alia, to the influence of the Accused and to the fact that the rape of Victim A occurred directly after the Accused instructed the group to rape, the Chamber finds that the Accused's encouragement constituted instigation because it was causally connected and substantially contributed to the actions of the principal perpetrator. The assailant's statement that he had been given permission to rape Victim A is evidence of a clear link between the Accused's statement and the crime. The Chamber also finds that the Accused made his statement intentionally with the awareness that he was influencing the perpetrator to commit the crime.
479. The Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the Accused instigated the rape of Victim A as a crime against humanity. Therefore, the Chamber finds the Accused guilty on Count 10."
"492. The Chamber finds that the Accused’s instruction constituted instigation because his words were causally connected to and substantially contributed to the killing of Victim B. In reaching this conclusion the Chamber has noted, inter alia, that the principal perpetrators were present during the Accused’s statement and that they immediately attacked female Tutsi victims as specified by the Accused. The Chamber finds that the Accused made his statement with the awareness and intention that his words would influence the crowd to commit murder as a crime against humanity. The Chamber therefore finds that the Accused is criminally responsible for instigating the principal perpetrators to commit murder as a crime against humanity."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
M.P.6. Evidence of decisions of a high command being systematically implemented by subsidiary organs
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgement (TC), 1 September 2004, paras. 359-360:
"3. Instigating
359. Many of the decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff for which the Accused bears responsibility requested that certain acts amounting to crimes be carried out. Most of the decisions did not take immediate effect and required implementation by, e.g., municipal organs. In this context, it is immaterial whether the physical perpetrators were subordinate to the instigator, or whether a number of other persons would necessarily have to be involved before the crime was actually committed, as long as it can be shown that there was a causal link between an act of instigation and the commission of a particular crime. Causality needs to be established between all acts of instigation and the acts committed by the physical perpetrators, even where the former are the public utterances of the Accused.
360. The Trial Chamber has found that decisions of the ARK Crisis Staff regarding the disarmament, dismissal and resettlement of non-Serbs were systematically implemented by the municipal Crisis Staffs, the local police, and the military. Moreover, it has been abundantly proved that the Accused made several inflammatory and discriminatory statements, inter alia, advocating the dismissal of non-Serbs from employment, and stating that only a few non-Serbs would be permitted to stay on the territory of the ARK. In light of the various positions of authority held by the Accused throughout the relevant time, these statements could only be understood by the physical perpetrators as a direct invitation and a prompting to commit crimes. Against this background, the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the Accused instigated the commission of some crimes charged in the Indictment."
M.P.8. Evidence of the principal perpetrators’ presence during the suspect’s statement
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No, ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement (TC), 15 May 2003, para. 492:
"492. The Chamber finds that the Accused’s instruction constituted instigation because his words were causally connected to and substantially contributed to the killing of Victim B. In reaching this conclusion the Chamber has noted, inter alia, that the principal perpetrators were present during the Accused’s statement and that they immediately attacked female Tutsi victims as specified by the Accused. The Chamber finds that the Accused made his statement with the awareness and intention that his words would influence the crowd to commit murder as a crime against humanity. The Chamber therefore finds that the Accused is criminally responsible for instigating the principal perpetrators to commit murder as a crime against humanity."
M.P.9. Evidence of the authority/influence of the suspect
M.P.9.1. Evidence of the assailant's statement that he had been given permission to rape
A. Legal source/authority and evidence:
Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No, ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement (TC), 15 May 2003, paras. 475-479:
"6. Count 10: Rape
475. Count 10 charges:
By his acts in relation to the events described in paragraph 3.17 above, Laurent SEMANZA is responsible for the RAPE of Victim A and Victim B as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population on political, ethnic or racial grounds, and has thereby committed CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY stipulated in Article 3(g) of the Statute of the Tribunal as a crime, attributed to him by virtue of Articles 6(1) and 6(3), and punishable in reference to Articles 22 and 23 of the same Statute.
476. The Chamber has found, in relation to paragraph 3.17 of the Indictment, that the Accused, in the presence of commune and military authorities, addressed a crowd and asked them how their work of killing the Tutsis was progressing and then encouraged them to rape Tutsi women before killing them. Immediately thereafter, one of the men from the crowd had non-consensual sexual intercourse with Victim A, who was hiding in a nearby home. The Chamber has found that Victim B was killed by two other men from this crowd, but has had insufficient evidence to draw any conclusions about whether she had also been raped.
477. The Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Victim A was raped by one of the assailants who heard the Accused encouraging the crowd to rape Tutsi women. In light of the generalized instructions about raping and killing Tutsis, the ethnic group targeted by the widespread attack, and the fact that the assailant arrived at Victim A's hiding place with two others who then killed Victim B, the Chamber finds that this rape was part of the widespread attack against the civilian Tutsi population and that the assailant was so aware. The Chamber therefore finds that the principal perpetrator committed rape as a crime against humanity.
478. Having regard, inter alia, to the influence of the Accused and to the fact that the rape of Victim A occurred directly after the Accused instructed the group to rape, the Chamber finds that the Accused's encouragement constituted instigation because it was causally connected and substantially contributed to the actions of the principal perpetrator. The assailant's statement that he had been given permission to rape Victim A is evidence of a clear link between the Accused's statement and the crime. The Chamber also finds that the Accused made his statement intentionally with the awareness that he was influencing the perpetrator to commit the crime.
479. The Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the Accused instigated the rape of Victim A as a crime against humanity. Therefore, the Chamber finds the Accused guilty on Count 10."
[B. Evidentiary comment:]
